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The safe operation of complex socio-technical systems including NPPs (Nuclear 
Power Plants) is a determinant for ensuring their sustainability. From this concern, it 
should be emphasized that a large portion of safety significant events were directly 
and/or indirectly caused by human errors. This means that the role of an HRA 
(Human Reliability Analysis) is critical because one of its applications is to 
systematically distinguish error-prone tasks triggering safety significant events. To 
this end, it is very important for HRA practitioners to access diverse HRA data 
which are helpful for understanding how and why human errors have occurred. In 
this study, a novel approach is suggested based on the Safety-II concept, which 
allows us to collect HRA data by considering failure and success cases in parallel. In 
addition, since huge amount of information can be gathered if the failure and 
success cases are simultaneously involved, a big data analysis technique called the 
CART (Classification And Regression Tree) is applied to deal with this problem. As 
a result, it seems that the novel approach proposed by combining the Safety-II 
concept with the CART technique is useful because HRA practitioners are able to get 
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The safe operation of complex socio-technical systems (e.g., petro-chemical 
systems, railway systems, health care systems, and transportation systems) is the 
most critical precondition for ensuring their sustainability. In this regard, it is very 
important to point out that a large portion of significant events that can impede the 
safe operation of the complex socio-technical systems was caused by human errors 
[Pasquale et al., 2015; Stock et al., 2007; El-Ladan and Turan, 2012, Hughes et al., 
2015]. For example, Akyuz (2015) and Evans (2011) stressed that human error is one 
of the main contributors affecting the risk of gas inerting processes and railway 
systems, respectively. In addition, accoring to recent statistics obtained from the 
operating experience of NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants), it is revealed that about 80% 
of significant events are attributable to human errors, which is almost four times 
compared to the contribution of equipment failures [IAEA, 2014]. This strongly 
implies that the management of human errors is key to enhance the safety of the 
complex socio-technical systems. In this light, the role of an HRA (Human Reliability 
Analysis) should be emphasized because it allows us to systematically manage the 
occurrence of human errors by evaluating the likelihood of a huamn error (or HEP, 
Human Error Probability) under a specific task context [Kirwan, 1994]. In other 
words, if we are able to properly calculate the HEPs of required tasks to be done by 
human operators working in the complex socio-technical systems, it is possible to 
effectively improve their safety by minimizing the occurrence of human errors. 
However, conducting an HRA is not a simple work because the spectrum of tasks 
to be covered by human operators working in complex socio-technical systems has a 
wide range of variability. This means that HRA practitioners are probably apt to 
request diverse HRA data that are helpful for understanding the nature of human 
errors under a given task context. Otherwise, the calculation of HEPs would become 
inaccurate resulting in the high uncertainty of HRA results (or managing the 
occurrecne of human errors). From this concern, many HRA practitioners have 
traditionally pointed out the necessity of typical HRA data (but not limited to) 
including: (1) the catalog of HEPs with respect to specific task types, (2) the 
inventory of error forcing factors usually called PSFs (Performance Shaping Factors) 
or PIFs (Performance Influence Factors), and (3) the effect of PSFs on the HEP of a 
specific task type (e.g., PSF multipliers) [Gertman et al., 2005; Kolaczkowski et al., 
2005; Lois et al., 2009; Park et al., 2017a]. 
For this reason, many researchers have spent extensive efforts for securing 
sufficient HRA data from various kinds of available sources, such as operating 
experiences (e.g., event investigation reports), observations from full-scope 
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simulators, experiment results using partial-scope simulators, expert judgments and 
interviews with subject matter experts [Park and Jung, 2013]. Of them, both the 
operating experiences and simulator observations have been regarded as major 
sources for collecting HRA data for many decades [IAEA, 1998; Kim et al., 2017a; 
Kim et al., 2017b; Kim et al., 2017c; Labarthe and Garza, 2010; NEA, 2008; Taylor-
Adams and Kirwan, 1995]. Table 1 summarizes representative pros and cons 
pertaining to the collection of HRA data from two representative sources: event 
investigation reports that reflect operating experiences and observations from full-
scope simulators. 
 
< Table 1. Comparing pros and cons pertaining to the collection of HRA data from 
two representative sources, modified from Park et al. (2016a) > 
Source Pros Cons 
Event 
investigation 
reports   
 Enable to secure more 
authentic HRA data that 
reflect a real task context 
 Free from a fidelity 
problem 
 Not easy to extract sufficient HRA 
data for rare events 
 Difficult to collect HRA data related 
to dynamic/interactive contexts (e.g., 
teamwork or team communications) 
 Need a careful translation due to 
uneven contents/descriptions  
Simulator 
observations  
 Enable to simulate rare (i.e., 
low frequency) events 
 Enable to observe the 
variation of human 
behaviors with respect to 
diverse task contexts 
 Require a huge amount of resources 
(e.g., budget, time, and manpower) 
 Not easy to secure sufficient times for 
using a full-scope simulator  
 Need to consider the effect of a 
fidelity problem 
 
As can be recognizable from Table 1, in terms of gathering sufficient amount of 
HRA data, the use of a full-scope simulator would be a more practical option 
because it allows us to observe the performance variation of human operators who 
are faced with diverse task contexts, of which the frequency is ranging from a highly 
unlikely to a highly likely. Unfortunately, although many researchers claimed that the 
behaviors of human operators observed from simulated task contexts would largely 
concur with those from a real task context [Gibson et al., 2006; Hirschberg and Dang, 
1996; Ohtsuka et al., 1994; Takano and Reason, 1999], it is also true that a fidelity 
problem would hinder the sole use of HRA data collected from full-scope simulators. 
In other words, it is still possible that the response of human operators observed 
from simulated task contexts would not be congruent with those expected from a 
real situation. Accordingly, in order to properly use HRA data extracted from 
simulator observations, it is necessary to simultaneously combine HRA data from 
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the two representative sources. 
Unfortunately, as summarized in Table 1, there are at least three obstacles 
impeding the accumulation of HRA data based on the analysis of event investigation 
reports: (1) it is not easy to extract HRA data from rare events, (2) it is difficult to 
collect HRA data related to dynamic task contexts such as teamwork or team 
communications, and (3) it is necessary to extract HRA data from the uneven 
contents and/or descriptions of event investigation reports. Of them, it is evident 
that the first and second obstacles cannot be technically resolved. For example, it is 
unrealistic to expect the existence of detailed investigation reports that explain the 
chronological sequences with the associated descriptions for rare events. In addition, 
it is hard to find out investigation reports that contain detailed explanations about 
the effect of dynamic and/or interactive task contexts (e.g., teamwork or team 
communications) on the occurrence of human errors resulting in safety significant 
events. This means that one of the plausible solutions is to develop a framework that 
allows us to systematically collect HRA data from event investigation reports, which 
have uneven contents and descriptions.  
For this reason, many researchers have tried to collect HRA data from the analysis 
of event investigation reports for several decades [Basra and Kirwan, 1998; Hallbert 
et al., 2004, Lucas and Embrey, 1989; Sträter, 2004]. For example, Hallbert et al. (2006) 
proposed the HERA (Human Event Repository and Analysis) framework that can be 
used for the analysis of LERs (Licensee Event Reports). Similarly, Kirwan et al. (1997) 
developed the CORE (Computerized Operator Reliability and Error) database that 
contains HRA data extracted from not only simulator observations but also the 
analysis of event investigation reports. However, most of existing HRA data 
extracted from event investigation reports seem to have a common limitation: 
focusing on a failure case.  
Let us assume that an LER has been issued, which describes the occurrence of a 
human error during the performance of a required task being described in a test 
procedure. In this case, the HERA framework can be applied to the analysis of the 
LER, and it is revealed that there is a critical problem in the design of an HMI 
(Human-Machine Interface) used for the performance of the required task. 
Accordingly, from the point of view of determining dominant PSFs, this 
investigation result would be very critical because it is strong evidence emphasizing 
the importance of an HMI design. The problem is that this HMI has been already 
used for many years without any kinds of human errors. This alludes to the fact that 
the effect of the HMI design on an HEP would be less critical than it seems. If so, it is 
reasonable to assume that HRA data extracted from the analysis of failure cases 
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could be biased because they are likely to represent the snap-shot of a task context 
only when a human error has occurred.  
Actually, the nature of this problem can be understood on the basis of a difference 
between the concepts of Safety-I and Safety-II. That is, from the point of view of the 
Safety-I concept, the safety of complex socio-technical systems can be enhanced by 
eliminating root causes resulting in failure cases. In contrast, the Safety-II concept 
emphasizes that the safety can be improved by encouraging important factors 
underlying the occurrence of success cases. Although the ultimate goal of these two 
concepts is identical, if we remind the fact that the HEP of the complex socio-
technical systems is ranging from 1.0E-5 to 1.0E-4, it is likely that the Safety-I concept 
could give a biased insight because the number of failure cases is extremely small 
than that of success cases (e.g., one failure case vs. 99,999 success cases). In this light, 
it is possible to expect that most of existing HRA data gathered from event 
investigation reports could be less informative because they represent failure cases. 
For this reason, in this study, a novel approach is suggested based on the Safety-II 
concept, which allows us to collect HRA data from the analysis of event 
investigation reports including success cases. It should be noted that, from hereafter, 
HRA data denotes the catalog of dominant PSFs with the associated multipliers. To 
this end, it is necessary to resolve three kinds of technical challenges: (1) what kinds 
of information items that could be essential for clarifying dominant PSFs should be 
collected from event investigation reports? (2) how these essential information items 
can be collected from success cases? and (3) how we are able to properly analyze a 
huge amount of information gathered from both failure and success cases? In order 
to resolve the first and second technical challenges, in this study, the catalog of 
generic information items suggested by Park et al. (2013) is combined with a 
framework proposed by Park et al. (2016c). In addition, one of the representative big 
data analysis techniques called the CART (Classification And Regression Tree) is 
applied to deal with the third technical challenge. 
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. First, the basic concepts of the 
Safety-I and Safety-II are briefly explained in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, the three 
kinds of technical challenges are described in detail with the associated solutions. 
Based on the descriptions of Section 3, then, Section 4 will explain how to extract 
HRA data from the analysis of event investigation reports with the results of a case 
study, which are related to diverse human errors experienced in domestic NPPs. 
Finally, the limitations of this study will be discussed with a concluding remark in 
Section 5.  
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2. Two different approaches to system safety  
Recently, a new paradigm of system safety called Safety-II has been introduced 
[Hollnagel et al. 2013]. The concepts and principles underlying Safety-II allow us to 
look at the two representative system safety activities, which are retrospective 
accident investigation and prospective risk assessment including HRA, from a 
different perspective [Hollnagel, 2002]. Thus they help us to supplement the 
limitations of traditional approaches to system safety (i.e., Safety-I). In this section, 
we review the characteristics and limitations of Safety-I and then describe the 
concepts and principles of Safety-II. In particular, we give a more detailed 
description about performance variability and the inevitable difference between 
work-as-imagined (WAI) and work-as-done (WAD), which can be regarded as two 
fundamental concepts for developing the new system paradigm (Safety-II).  
In the traditional paradigm of safety (i.e., Safety-I), safety is defined as the 
condition where the number of adverse outcomes (accidents and incidents) is as low 
as possible [Hollnagel, 2014]. When some unwanted things happen in a system, 
Safety-I attempts to ‘find and fix’ root causes for the problematic situations (find and 
fix approach). Thus, it looks for failures and malfunctions, try to find their plausible 
causes, and then eliminate causes or improve barriers. The philosophy underlying 
this approach is that success and failure have their different causes (hypothesis of 
different causes) [Hollnagel et al., 2013]. Thus it has been believed that wrong 
outcomes, such as accidents or incidents, have their corresponding causes that can 
be found and treated. This belief called causality-credo has been a fundamental 
principle underlying retrospective accident investigation and prospective risk 
assessment methods in Safety-I [Hollnagel, 2014]. Additionally, most of the 
retrospective accident investigation and prospective risk assessment methods in 
Safety-I paradgm assume an accident model that is based on linear cause-effect 
relationships. It is also presumed that the influence from contexts or conditions is 
limited and quantifiable. For all these reaons, the main focus of Safety-I has been on 
failure cases, rather than whole outcomes including successful outcomes, based on 
the belief that system safety can be enhanced by finding and fixing the causes of 
adverse outcomes and by reducing the risks associated with them to acceptable 
levels [Sujan et al., 2017].  
Focusing on accident investigation methods developed under the paradigm of 
Safety-I, we can summarize the characteristics of Safey-I as follows [Yoon et al., 2017]: 
(1) they attempt to diagnose an accident with a linear and simple cause-effect 
relationships, (2) they generally assume a accident causation model and attempt to 
explain an accident investigation based on the model, (3) they strive to look for a 
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root cause and tend to neglect other possible causes once a root cause is found, (4) 
they try to understand an accident with a pre-specified set of causal factors linked to 
a presumed causation model, (5) they have a stance that all adverse outcomes have 
their unique and respective causes, and (6) they are inclined to seek human errors 
and regard them as root causes [Hollnagel 2012; 2014; Hollnagel et al. 2013; Shorrock 
et al. 2014].  
The main goal of prospective risk assessment in Safety-I is to identify causes of an 
accident and contributory factors, based on the assumption that accidents are caused 
by failures and malfunctions [Hollnagel et al., 2013]. However, prospective risk 
assessment usually involves the investigation of previous accidents or events to 
obtain a set of data to be used for assessing human and system reliability. This 
means that accident investigation is one essential activity of HRA. Thus we can say 
that traditional HRA in Safety-I also shows the characteristics described above.  
However, it has been criticized that the assumptions and theoretical foundations 
of Safety-I are insufficient as a conceptual basis for effectively enhancing and 
managing system safety in modern complex socio-technical systems [Hollnagel, 
2017]. These systems are increasingly intractable, which means that it is not possible 
to prescribe tasks and actions in every detail. This negates that the assumptions and 
foundations of Safety-I can be resonably applied to these systems. A lot of accidents 
or incidents we have experienced during the last decades also indicate that the 
failure behaviour of these systems cannot be easily explained in terms of linear 
cause-effect relationships [Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 1995, 2011; Yoon et al., 2016].  
Here we need to consider the critical problems of Safety-I in relation to the 
characterisitcs of modern complex socio-technical systems. As explained above, since 
the complexity and uncertainty of these systems escalate more and more, they are 
increasingly intractable [Shorrock et al., 2014]. Therefore, it is actually impossible to 
predict all task situations and prescribe all the task performance thoroughly. This 
means that human operators in a system should exhibit some degree of variability or 
adaptability in order to deal with a range of dynamic situations, including exessive 
cognitive demands under unexpected situations, thereby making the system work 
properly [Hollnagel, 2012]. It is necessary to recognize that performance variability is 
absolutely needed and valuable for the safe operation of a complex socio-technical 
system. It implies that performance variability or adjustments is the reason for both 
successful and failed outcomes [Hollnagel, 2014; Sujan et al., 2015]. A same task 
performance can be variable and thus result in either successful or failed outcomes, 
depending on a range of factors such as PSFs [Hollnagel, 2009]. This is the view 
contrasted with the hypothesis of different causes in Safety-I. The concept of 
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performance variability implies that it is necessary to understand the characteristics 
of everyday performance variability to enhance system safety, rather than looking 
for ways in which something can fail or malfunction [Patterson et al., 2015].  
Another important issue can also be identified from the fact that modern systems 
are increasingly intractable. If we assume that task situations can be completely 
analyzed and prescribed, work-as-imagined (WAI) will properly correspond to 
work-as-done (WAD). However, it is highly likely that WAD is significantly 
different from WAI under an intractable system. This is highly related to the concept 
of performance variability. We admit that when a system work reliably, it is because 
human operatorss exhibit performance adjustment or performance variability, rather 
than the system is perfectly designed or all the task situations are completely 
prescribed. This implies that system safety efforts should focus on understanding 
WAD rather than WAI and considering how to support WAD in order to enhance 
the ability of performance adjustment [Hollnagel, 2016; Lundberg et al., 2010; Sujan 
et al., 2017].  
It should be noted that Safety-I approach does not well consider those two 
important things: performance variability and inevitable difference between WAD 
and WAI [Hollnagel, 2014, 2016]. Considering the importance of them, we can say 
that an approach to enhancing system safety should understand everyday 
performance varibility and correspond to WAD rather than WAI [Woljter et al., 
2015]. However, Safety-I begins by asking why things go wrong and then attempts 
to find the assumed causes for the purpose of ensuring that it does not happen again. 
This means that it tries to reestablish WAI. Then, what is a resonable alternative 
approach to system safety? It is to ask why things go right in most of task situations 
and then attempts to ensure that this happens again. This is the motivation of 
developing Safety-II approach for the purpose of supplementing the drawbacks of 
Safety-I. In terms of efficiency of using the information we can obtain, it can be said 
that Safety-I focuses only on failure cases, which are very small sample in 
comparison to success cases. Thus we can say that it is more desirable to make use of 
various successful stories to derive insights useful for improving system safety, as 
well as limited unsuccessful cases.  
It should be again emphasized that we need to examine what things go right to 
understand how unacceptable outcomes happen, instead of only looking at what 
goes wrong. We need to admit that systems work right because human operators are 
able to adjust their performance rather than they are perfectly designed and work-
as-imagined. The reason why human operators able to work effectively and 
successfully is that they continuously adjust their activities to the current dynamic 
 
8 
situations. Thus understanding how successful outcomes happen is the necessary 
basis for understanding how wrong outcomes happen [Hollnagel, 2016]. For this 
reason, when some bad things happen, we should begin by investigating how they 
usually work successfully, instead of searching for a set of plausible causes for 
explaining only the failures. Based on these theoretical bases, Safety-II defines safety 
as a condition where the number of successful outcomes is as high as possible and 
regards it as the ability to succeed under varying conditions. Safety-II is achieved by 
trying to make sure that things go right, instead of preventing them from going 
wrong. Accordingly, the basis for system safety activities in Safety-II must be 
understanding of why systems work successfully in many situations, which means 
an understanding of everyday performance variability.  
Previously, we summarized the six characteristics of Safety-I, focusing on accident 
investigation methods. Here, based on the concepts and principles of Safety-II, we 
can also summarize the following six characteristics of Safety-II, which correspond, 
in order, to those of Safety-I [Yoon et al., 2017]: (1) an accident analysis method 
should admit that an accident cannot be sufficiently explained by linear, simple 
cause-effect relationships, (2) an accident needs to be investigated without too much 
relying on an accident causation model, (3) an accident is not so simple that it can be 
sufficiently explained only with a root-cause, (4) it should be acknowledged that the 
currently assumed set of causal factors may not be actual causes of the accident and 
that other contextual factors assumed not to be problematic may be actual causes, (5) 
the causes of successful outcomes and adverse outcomes are not different but the 
same, and (6) an accident analysis method should focus on the performance 
variability in terms of resource demands and resources available in the situation of 
an accident, instead of human errors [Hollnagel 2012; 2014; Hollnagel et al. 2013; 
Leonhardt et al. 2009; Shorrock et al. 2014]. Considering the characteristics above, we 
can say that the purpose of prospective risk assessment in Safety-II is to understand 
the conditions where performance variability can become difficult or impossible to 
monitor and control [Hollnagel et al., 2013]. 
However, one should not think that traditional approaches are useless due to 
their drawbacks. In spite of those shortcomings, they are still useful in retrospective 
accident investigation and prospective risk assessment [Salmon et al., 2012; Shorrock, 
2014; Yoon et al., 2017]. Nonetheless, it should also be noted that there is a growing 
number of accidents in modern complex socio-technical systems where Safety-I 
approach cannot be effectively used [Hollnagel 2014]. For this reason, system safety 
engineer should always keep in mind the limitations of Safety-I paradigm and 
attempt to overcome them. It is important to acknowledge that Safety-I and Safety-II 
represent two complementary views of safety; they are never two incompatible or 
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conflicting approaches. Thus, we can say that it is desirable to develop a method that 
can support the use of traditional approaches to system safety as well as help 
analysts avoid their drawbacks.  
Lastly, there is one point that we should not misunderstand in regard to the focus 
areas of the two safety paradigms. One misunderstanding we should avoid is that 
Safety-II is only concerned with successful outcomes, excluding unsuccessful 
outcomes. It should be emphasized that Safety-I is only concerned with a set of 
limited unsuccessful outcomes such as human errors, whereas Safety-II focuses on a 
lot of diverse successful outcomes as well as a set of limited unsuccessful outcomes 
[Hollnagel, 2014; Hollnagel et al., 2013]. However, their critical difference should be 
found in their viewpoint on system safety and several principles for ensuring system 
safety, though they are different in terms of focus areas as well. As explained above, 
because each of the two paradigms has its own advantages, it is desirable to 
integrate them, not replacing Safety-I with Safety-II. Resilience engineering is a new 
academic discipline addressing this issue [Hollnagel et al., 2010]. It does not claim 
the wholesale replacement of Safety-I by Safety-II, but rather proposes a systematic 
combination of the two ways of thinking on safety [Hollnagel, 2016]. In order to 
enhance system resilience, it emphasizes that a system should exhibit four abilities: 
learning (knowing what has happened), responding (knowing what to do), 
monitoring (knowing what to look for), and anticipating (knowing what to expect) 
[Hollnagel et al., 2010]. However, as resilience engineering is beyond the scope of 
this paper, we do not delve into it further.   
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3. Resolving technical challenges 
As briefly mentioned at the end of Section 1, from the point of view of the Safety-
II concept, at least three kinds of technical challenges should be addressed for the 
collection of HRA data from the analysis of event investigation reports. In this 
regard, this section will explain how to actually resolve these technical challenges. 
 
3.1 Essential information to be collected from event investigation reports 
The first technical issue to be resolved is to determine the contents of information 
to be collected from the analysis of event investigation reports. Basically, it is evident 
that the contents of information extractable from a given event investigation report 
are largely dependent on its description level (i.e., the more the event investigation 
report tells detailed task contexts, the more the amount of extracted information 
increases). In addition, since the purpose of this study is to accumulate HRA data 
(i.e., the catalog of dominant PSFs with their multipliers) for supporting HRA 
practitioners, the following fundamental rule should be emphasized for analyzing 
event investigation reports: All kinds of information should be supportive of an HRA.  
Accordingly, it is natural to expect that that the contents of information can be 
determined by the following two phases: (1) selecting the catalog of PSF-related 
information items from generic information items that are needed for supporting the 
conduction of an HRA, and (2) narrowing down the catalog of PSF-related 
information items that are actually collectable from the description of an event 
investigation report. For this reason, the list of generic information items proposed 
by Park and Jung (2013) is regarded as a starting point to resolve the first technical 




<Figure 1. Identifying the list of generic information items; reproduced from Park 
and Jung (2013) >  
Considering different viewpoints about human errors
Reviewing existing documents issued from different viewpoints
Identifying information items specified in existing documents








As can be seen from Fig. 1, the first step is to distinguish diverse viewpoints about 
the definition of human errors. Then, as the second step, various kinds of existing 
documents (such as requirements, standards, guidelines, and good practices), which 
have published based on the reflection of each distinctive viewpoint are reviewed in 
detail. Consequently, it was possible to figure out several groups of information 
items that are necessary for supporting HRA practitioners who will probably use 
different HRA methods and/or techniques. The last step is to integrate these groups 
into the list of genetic information items.  
As a result, Park and Jung (2013) identified a total of 89 generic information items 
belonging to the following 7 categories: (1) Environment, (2) HMI, (3) Organization, 
(4) Procedure, (5) Task, (6) Success criteria, and (7) Actual condition. At the same 
time, they also proposed detailed instances that can be regarded as specific 
indicators for each generic information item. From these generic information items, 
the catalog of PSF-related information items is selected with and the associated 
instances. For example, Table 2 shows a part of PSF-related information items, which 
belong to the categories of Task and Actual condition. 
 
< Table 2. A part of PSF-related information items and the associated instances > 
Category Information item Suggested instances 
Task Expected cues for 
task initiation 
Alarm(s), Indication alerts, Parameters, 
Symptoms, Person (supervisor request), 




Operator working in an MCR (Main Control 
Room), Local (or auxiliary) operator, 






High-precision reading, Status check readings, 
Rapidly comparing separate readings, 
Monitoring data over time, Monitoring rapidly 
changing data, Performance of repetitive 
computations, Execution of rapid, fixed 
sequences, and Any task for satisfying real-time 
constraints (e.g., pressurizer pressure control) 
Actual 
condition 
Task load Task situation requiring: (1) short-term memory, 
(2) long-term memory, and (3) decision-making 
Workload Cognitive, Physical, and Serial/parallel overlap 
of task elements 
Nature of decision 
making 
Relative decision making, Absolute decision 




For example, for the PSF-related information item of Expected cues for task initiation 
belonging to the category of Task, existing documents suggested several instances 
(i.e., practical and/or tangible entities) such as Alarm, Indication alerts, Parameters, 
Symptoms, Person, Procedure step, and Self-initiation. This means that, in terms of 
Expected cues for task initiation, most of existing HRA methods provides detailed 
methods and/or techniques for estimating HEPs based on the values of diverse cue 
types suggested as instances. Accordingly, if we consider these instances (for the 
sake of convenience, the term of PSF-related instances will be used hereafter) from the 
beginning of the analysis of event investigation reports, it is possible to provide 
HRA data that can support HRA practitioners in more effective manner (i.e., direct 
use of collected HRA data without further modifications or translations). 
 
3.2 Collecting information from success cases 
The second technical issue is to collect the values of PSF-related instances with 
respect to success cases. In order to clarify this issue, let us consider an unanticipated 
reactor trip event that has occurred in one of the commercial NPPs in the Republic of 
Korea on December 4, 2008 [Park et al., 2016c]. Brief explanations about this event 
are given as below, and more detailed information can be found from NEED (2017). 
 
On December 4, 2008, while the unit was operating at 100% power, a local operator was 
performing a surveillance test procedure entitled ‘Gadolinium Sampling of Poison Tank for 
the Reactor Shutdown System No. 2(SDS-2).’ Since one of the main purposes in conducting 
this surveillance test procedure is to check the concentration of a Poison Tank, it is 
necessary to sample a small amount of Gadolinium liquid from it. During the surveillance 
test, however, the local operator opened the recirculation valve of the Poison Tank #2 by 
mistake when he should have opened the corresponding valve of the Poison Tank #4. As a 
result, due to the injection of Gadolinium into the moderator system, an unexpected reactor 
trip has occurred. 
From a detailed investigation, it was found that one of the root causes for a wrong valve 
manipulation was an inherent problem in the surveillance test procedure. That is, since the 
surveillance test procedure was developed so that the surveillance test of six Poison Tanks 
can be implemented by using a single procedure, it is expected that a human error was 
triggered by an unclear component specification. 
 
From the above explanations, it is evident that one of the root causes triggering a 
wrong valve operation is the inappropriate description of a task included in the 
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surveillance test procedure (for convenience, the term of test procedure is used 
hereafter). Fig. 2 shows a part of the test procedure with the associated component 
configuration, which will be helpful for understanding why the wrong valve 
operation has occurred.  
 
Required tasks described in the 
test procedure 
[…] 
 Verify the valve of 13@ is CLOSED. 
 Verify the valve of V10@ is CLOSED. 
 Open the valve of V21@. 
[…] 
 
< Figure 2. A part of the test procedure with the associated component 
configuration, adopted from Park et al. (2017b) > 
 
As can be seen from Fig. 2, a local operator has to carry out the surveillance test of 
six equivalent Poison Tanks. To this end, the local operator needs to conduct a series 
of required tasks being described in the test procedure once in every seven days. For 
example, when the local operator finished the surveillance test of the Poison Tank #1 
this week, he or she has to accomplish the surveillance test of the Poison Tank #4 in 










































procedure for each Poison Tank, a single test procedure has been used for many 
years for their surveillance test. Subsequently, the description of the test procedure 
should be prepared based on a kind of generalized notation, such as the mark of ‘@’ 
underscored in Fig. 2. For example, when a local operator wants to sample a small 
amount of liquid from Poison Tank #4, he or she needs to switch the mark of ‘@’ to 
the number of ‘4.’ This means that, in order to clarify the contents of required tasks, 
the description of the test procedure exemplified in Fig. 2 should be read as follows: 
 Verify the valve of V134 is CLOSED. 
 Verify the valve of 104 is CLOSED. 
 Open the valve of V214. 
 
Unfortunately, even though the local operator tried to sample Poison Tank #4 on 
December 8, 2008, he accidently opened the valve of V212 instead of V214. As a 
result, an injection path was activated from Poison Tank #4 to a reactor, which 
caused an unexpected reactor trip (refer to an injection path highlighted by a thick 
line in Fig. 3). Based on this finding, one of the countermeasures to prevent from the 
recurrence of similar events was decided as the provision of dedicated test 
procedures for six Poison Tanks. 
If we extract HRA data from this event, it is natural that the quality of a procedure 
(i.e., an inappropriate task description) would be regarded as one of the dominant 
PSFs. However, this decision seems to be impetuous because it was drawn based on 
the sole consideration of a failure case. In other words, if the quality of the test 
procedure is critical for triggering a wrong valve operation, it is not possible to 
properly explain the reason why the identical test procedure has been carried out for 
many years without any kinds of human errors. This alludes to the fact that the 
selection of dominant PSFs may need to simultaneously consider the values of PSF-
related instances (refer to Table 2) from two different cases: failure and success cases. 
Here, it is relatively easy to determine the values of PSF-related instances from 
failure cases because event investigation reports are available. Unfortunately, 
determining the values of PSF-related instances from success cases is not easy 
because of a lack of available documents clarifying success cases, which correspond 
to event investigation reports. For this reason, a framework proposed by Park et al. 
(2016) is partially adopted to systematically gather information from success cases in 
this study. More detailed explanations about how to determine the values of 





< Figure 3. An injection path activated by a wrong valve operation, adopted from 
Park et al. (2017b) > 
 
3.3 Introduction to the CART technique 
The last technical issue is originated from a practical problem: how we are able to 
deal with a huge amount of information gathered from both failure cases and success cases? 
For example, let us recall a wrong valve operation explained in Section 3.2. In this 
case, although we have only one failure case, the number of success cases would be 
significant because the test procedure should be repeatedly performed once in every 
seven days. In other words, if the test procedure has been performed for seven years, 
the number of success cases would be over 300. This means that the amount of 
information to be processed (i.e., the values of PSF-related instances) would 
drastically increase along with the increase of the number of success cases. For this 
reason, the CART which is one of the well-known techniques for analyzing big data 
is introduced in this study. 
Although there are many definitions that emphasize slightly different aspects of 






























analytics is “the process of examining large and varied data sets (i.e., big data) to 
uncover hidden patterns, unknown correlations, market trends, customer 
preferences and other useful information that can help organizations make more-
informed business decisions [SBA, 2017].” To this end, many kinds of techniques 
have been developed, and seven widely used big data mining techniques are 
grouped into: (1) associated rule learning, (2) CART analysis, (3) genetic algorithms, 
(4) machine learning, (5) regression analysis, (6) sentiment analysis, and (7) social 
network analysis [Firmex, 2017].  
Of them, the CART technique is very useful because it allows us to identify 
unique and/or hidden categories from big data. The more interesting point is that its 
confidence level drastically increases along with the increase of data size. In order to 
clarify these benefits of the CART analysis, let us consider Fig. 4a that shows the 
result of the CART analysis based on available data from the Internet [Kaggle, 2018], 
which contain the information of 891 passengers embarked on the Titanic sank in the 
North Atlantic Ocean on April 15, 1912.  
 
 
< Figure 4a. Explanatory result of the CART analysis, modified from 
Bigwhalelearning (2014) > 
No Gender Age Embarked Class … Survival
1 Male 22 Southampton (SH) 3 No
2 Female 38 Cherbourg  (C) 1 Yes
3 Female 26 Southampton (SH) 3 Yes
4 Female 35 Southampton (SH) 1 Yes
5 Male 35 Southampton (SH) 3 No
6 Male Unknown Queenstown (Q) 3 No
…






















































As can be seen from Fig. 4a, the result of the CART analysis allows us to estimate 
the chances of survival based on the values of several instances (such as Gender, Age, 
and Class). For example, from this available information, it is possible to say that the 
chance of survival for female passengers in Titanic is about four times higher than 
that of male passengers based on the following formulas: 
p(survival|𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇) =  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇
 
                                                      =
10 + 13 + 86
577
= 0.189   
p(survival|𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇) =  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠
 
                                                       =
33 + 39 + 161
314
= 0.742 
More interesting point is that the CART analysis can be conducted with respect to 
the catalog of specific factors. For example, Fig. 4b hypothetically depicts the result 
of the CART analysis, which is classified from the information of all passengers 
based on two kinds of dedicated factors, Class and Age. With this result, the chances 
of survival can be visualized in the form of a decision tree which is given at the 
bottom of Fig. 4b. Although this decision tree is hypothetical, it demonstrated that 
the chance of survival for passengers who brought the 3rd class ticket is about one 
third compared to those of the first class passengers whose age were greater than 16 
(i.e., 0.242 vs. 0.650). Or it is possible to say that the first class ticket increased the 
survival chance of passengers those whose age is greater than 16 about 56% 
compared to that of the second class ticket (i.e., 0.650 vs. 0.416). 
Here, if we focus on the applicability of the CART technique to the extraction of 
HRA data, it is evident that both HEPs and the catalog of dominant PSFs can be 
systematically selected with the associated relative weights (i.e., PSF multipliers). 
Figure 5 will be helpful for elucidating this idea. Let us assume that there is a big 
data containing the values of diverse instances (i.e., PSF-related instances for 
describing the context of each task). At the same time, the result of each task 
performance is also known as either success (i.e., a required task is completed 
without any kinds of human errors) or failure (i.e., the occurrence of a human error). 
If we apply the CART technique to this big data, a kind of decision tree can be 
created as exemplified in Fig. 5. Once this decision tree is developed, it is possible to 
distinguish the catalog of dominant PSFs which largely affect the occurrence of 
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human errors (i.e., HEPs). In addition, if we compare HEPs with respect to diverse 




< Figure 4b. Hypothetical decision tree with respect to Class and Age, modified 
from Frendly (2015) > 
 
 

























No or Unknown 0.636 (=42/66)
Task
No.
PSF1 PSF2 … PSFn Error
1 Yes High … 15 No
2 No High … 8 No
3 No Medium … 23 Yes
4 No Low … 4 No
…


















4. Case study  
 
4.1 Framework to determine the values of PSF-related instances 
As explained at the end of Section 3, it is expected that the CART analysis allows 
us to extract HRA data in a systematic manner. To this end, however, it is 
indispensable to determine the values of PSF-related instances representing various 
kinds of contexts, in which human operators have to accomplish required tasks. This 
means that the catalog of required tasks should be specified prior to determining the 
values of the PSF-related instances. In addition, in order to determine the values of 
the PSF-related instances for success cases, it is necessary to set up dedicated rules 
for calculating the number of success cases from the contents of event investigation 
reports. For these reasons, two kinds of cornerstones are established as follows. 
First of all, in terms of preparing the catalog of required tasks, a total of 21 task 
types which were proposed by Park et al. (2016b) are borrowed in this study. Table 3 
epitomizes the inventory of task types with the associated abbreviations. From Table 
3, these 21 task types are self-explainable because they were distinguished based on 
four kinds of representative cognitive activities: (1) information gathering and 
reporting (IG), (2) situation interpretation (SI), (3) response planning and instruction 
(RP), and (4) execution (EX).  
For example, the second task type of Table 3 is Verifying state of indicator, which 
denotes a task type demanding the status check reading of a specific indicator, while 
the fifth task type (i.e., Comparing parameter) corresponds to the rapid comparison of 
two or more process parameters from separated readings, such as pressurizer 
pressure and main steam pressure. Moreover, the features of three kinds of task 
types pertaining to the cognitive activity of Execution can be summarized as follows. 
 Manipulating simple (discrete) control: a task type to be accomplished by the 
performance of a binary control (e.g., On-Off, Start-Stop, and Open-Close); 
 Manipulating simple (continuous) control: a task type to be completed by either 
selecting a target (or necessary) state from two or more discrete states or 
selecting a specific value within a given continuous range (e.g., setting Manual 
mode from five selectable operation modes such as Manual, Auto, Modulate, Slow 
close, and Fast close); 
 Manipulating dynamically: a task type requiring the real-time control of a target 
component and/or parameter through integrating diverse information (e.g., 





< Table 3. Inventory of task types, modified from Park et al. (2016b) > 
ID Cognitive 
activity 




Verifying alarm occurrence IG-alarm 
2 Verifying state of indicator IG-indicator 
3 Synthetically verifying information IG-synthesis 
4 Reading simple value IG-value 
5 Comparing parameter IG-comparison 
6 Comparing in graph constraint IG-graph 
7 Comparing for abnormality IG-abnormality 





10 Identifying overall status SI-identification 





Entering step in procedure RP-entry 
13 Transferring procedure RP-procedure 
14 Transferring step in procedure RP-step 
15 Directing information gathering RP-information 
16 Directing manipulation RP-manipulation 
17 Directing notification/request RP-notification 
18 Execution  
(EX) 
Manipulating simple (discrete) control EX-discrete 
19 Manipulating simple (continuous) control EX-continuous 
20 Manipulating dynamically EX-dynamic 




It should be noted that the task types of Table 3 properly cover the instances of 
Expected task demand (refer to Table 2). For example, Status check reading and Rapidly 
comparing separate readings are directly comparable to the task types of Verifying state 
of indicator and Comparing parameter, respectively. In addition, it is evident that Any 
task for satisfying real-time constraints corresponds to the task type of Manipulating 
dynamically. 
Second, in order to calculate the number of success cases, three kinds of practical 
rules are considered. Actually, the underlying idea for calculating the number of 
success cases is very straightforward. For example, let us assume that a local 
operator who is working in an NPP has to carry out a specific test procedure once in 
every seven days (TPeriod) during a power operation, which consists of many tasks. In 
addition, it is already known that this test procedure has been conducted for seven 
years without any kinds of human errors. In this case, if we know how many days 
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the NPP has been continuously operated with a full power (TFP), the number of 
successful performance of the test procedure (𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝) can be estimated by Eq(1). 
 
Number of successful performance for a procedure (𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝) = 
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
 ·········  Eq. (1) 
 
If so, the key problem is to reckon TFP. To this end, Park et al. (2016c) proposed 
three principal rules for calculating TFP. Unfortunately, these three rules are not 
directly applicable to calculating the number of success cases when an off-normal 
event has occurred. For example, let us assume that an event report indicated that 
there was a human error during the performance of an abnormal operating 
procedure (AOP) which can deal with the trip of a main feedwater pump. The 
question is that, when a human error was observed during the performance of the 
corresponding AOP, how many times this AOP has been successfully conducted in 
the past.  
In this light, Park et al. (2016c) proposed a practical method based on the 
representative frequencies of 101 abnormal events, which are determined by 
scrutinizing various kinds of component failure data collected from of domestic 
NPPs [KHNP, 2011]. According to the catalog of the representative frequencies, for 
example, it is anticipated that the trip of a main feedwater pump is supposed to 
occur about twice a year. This means that the number of a successful performance 
with respect to the AOP of a main feedwater pump trip can be calculated by using 
Eq. (1), if we divide 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 by its representative frequency. That is, the number of a 
successful performance for the AOP of a main feedwater pump trip can be obtained 
by quantifying 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹/2.0. More detailed explanations can be found from Park et al., 
(2016c). 
 
4.2 Analyzing event investigation reports 
In order to make sure the applicability of the framework described in Section 4.1, 
event investigation reports stored in a database called NEED (Nuclear Event 
Evaluation Database) are revisited in this study. The NEED is operated by the 
regulator body of the Republic of Korea (i.e., KINS, Korea Institute of Nuclear 
Safety), which contains various kinds of investigation reports issued for safety 
significant events including: (1) an unexpected automatic and/or manual reactor trip, 
(2) the initiation of ESFs (Engineered Safety Features), and (3) the violation of LCOs 
(Limiting Conditions for Operations) [NEED, 2017]. That is, when one of the safety 
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significant events has occurred in a domestic NPP, a special inspection team is 
temporally established by the KINS, which consists of several specialists for 
investigating what went wrong. Once the investigation is finished, all kinds of 
information (e.g., the cause and progression of an event, investigation results, and 
countermeasures to prevent the reoccurrence of same or similar events) should be 
released to the public via the Internet.  
From the NEED, a total of 193 investigation reports that have issued from January 
2002 to December 2013 were reviewed in detail. As a result, 16 event investigation 
reports were selected, of which the root causes include a wrong device operation, the 
omission of a procedural step, and providing a wrong control input. Here, during 
the period of January 2002 to December 2013, the statistics of the NEED revealed that 
the total number of significant events caused by human errors is 41 [NEED, 2017]. 
This means that about 40% of significant events which were related to human errors 
are analyzed in this study. It should be noted that the 60% of significant events were 
not considered if the associated procedures were either not available or uncertain. 
For example, several significant events have occurred during the initial start-up 
operation of newly constructed NPPs (i.e., a test period before starting the first fuel 
cycle). This means that most of set-points and/or task descriptions included in 
procedures are apt to be vastly changed as time goes by. In addition, since a large 
portion of the corresponding procedures which are directly related to the occurrence 
of significant events was abandoned when revised procedures came in, it is not 
possible to identify the contents of tasks resulting in the associated human errors.  
After the selection of 16 event investigation reports, their contents were prudently 
checked in order to clarify the inventory of PSF-related instances, of which the 
values can be actually identifiable. Table 4 summarizes a part of this PSF inventory 
with the associated values collectable from the contents of event investigation 
reports. For example, the third instance of Table 4 (i.e., Procedure conformity) implies 
whether or not the description of a required task in a procedure is congruent with 
the situation at hand. This is because the drastic change of one or more process 
parameters could bring about the distortion of an original intention being described 
in a task. In addition, Clarity of decision-making criteria denotes whether or not criteria 
for judgment or decision-making included in the task description of a procedure are 
clear and evident. The meaning of this instance becomes more evident if we compare 
the following two tasks: (1) verify whether or not SG level is rapidly lowering and (2) 
verify that SG level is greater than 70%. Comparing to the decisive criterion of the latter 
task, that of the former task is somewhat subjective due to the term of ‘rapidly.’ In 
this way, a total of 27 PSF-related instances are used in this study. It is to be noted 
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that more detailed explanations about each PSF-related instance can be found from 
Park et al. (2013). 
 
< Table 4. A part of PSF-related instances, of which the values can be extractable 
from the contents of event investigation reports > 
ID Suggested instance Meaning/Example 
1 HMI (human machine 
interface) type 
HMI used in the performance of a required task 
(Analog or Digital) 
2 Operator  Operator who conducted an error (MCR* or Local staff) 
3 Component 
manipulation mode 
Type of control to accomplish a required task (On/Off 
or Adjusting control) 
4 Procedure conformity The conformity of task contents described in a 
procedure with an on-going status 
5 Clarity of decision-
making criteria 
Judgment (or decision-making) criteria included in 
the task description of a procedure 
6 Clear description of an 
object 
Whether or not a specific component designator 
(identifier) is described in a task description (e.g., 
Open flow control valve vs. Open valve #123) 
7 Clear description of 
means 
Whether or not a specific method for a component 
manipulation is manifested in a task description (e.g., 
Maintain SG pressure vs. Maintain SG pressure using 
atmospheric dump valve) 
8 Information clarity Whether or not an HMI provides necessary 
information for conducting a required task 
9 Feedback information Whether or not an HMI provide feedback information 
followed by the manipulation of a certain component 
10 Conformity of 
standards 
Whether or not an HMI is designed along with 
standards, conventions and nomenclature (e.g., 
abbreviations and acronyms) 
*Main Control Room 
 
Based on the PSF inventory, the context of a task included in a specific procedure 
is characterized. For example, let us assume a hypothetical test procedure containing 
many tasks. Here, if there is an event investigation report that describes the 
occurrence of a human error during the performance of this test procedure, the 
number of successful performance for the test procedure (i.e., 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝) can be calculated 
along with concepts explained at the end of Section 4.1 (e.g., three practical rules for 
routine test and maintenance procedures, and representative frequencies for event 
response procedures). After that, in terms of success cases, the context of task types 
included in the test procedure can be characterized by the values of PSF-related 
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instances which are distinguishable from diverse efforts, such as talk-through with 
experienced human operators and walk-through in a working place.  
It should be noted that since there was no human error in success cases, the values 
of PSF-related instances for each task type are duplicated by 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝 times. In other 
words, it is assumed that all the values of PSF-related instances are identical for 
success cases. In contrast, in the case of a failure case, the values of PSF-related 
instances for each task type can be determined based on the description of the 
corresponding event investigation report.  
For example, an event investigation report revealed that a wrong valve operation 
has occurred because a local operator who carried out the test procedure did not 
have any feedback information at that time due to the failure of indicator. In this 
case, the value of Feedback information that is one of the PSF-related instances 
epitomized in Table 4 should be marked as No. In this way, a total of 47,219 records 
representing the contexts of all tasks included in diverse procedures were secured, 
which are related to the occurrence of human errors described in 16 event 
investigation reports (refer to Fig. 6). 
 
 
< Figure 6. A part of records for the values of the suggested instances summarized 




4.3 Applying the CART analysis 
Based on the values of the suggested instances shown in Fig. 8, the CART analysis 
was carried out by using R package [R Project, 2013]. Table 5 highlights a part of 
important results obtained from the CART analysis. As can be seen from Table 5, of 
27 PSF-related instances summarized in Table 4, significant results are obtained with 
respect to 14 PSF-related instances. For example, the PSF-related instance of 
Procedure conformity denotes whether or not the description of a given procedure is 
well congruent with a real situation. In other words, there was no difficulty in 
conducting required tasks as written because hypothetical conditions assumed for 
the development of a procedure are properly matched with those of a real situation 
(e.g., WAD and WAI are similar). In this case, Procedure conformity is marked as Yes. 
In contrast, if there is any mismatch between these two conditions (i.e., Procedure 
conformity corresponds to No), it is not easy for human operators to carry out the 
procedure as written.  
 
< Table 5. Selected significant results obtained from the CART analysis > 
PSF-related instance Value HEP HEP ratio 
HMI type Analog 3.01E-4 1.0 (base) 
Digital 3.08E-3 10.2 
Operator MCR staff 1.27E-3 8.4 
Local staff 1.52E-4 1.0 (base) 
Component manipulation 
mode 
Simple control 4.78E-4 1.0 (base) 
Adjusting control 2.52E-3 5.27 
Procedure conformity Yes 2.16E-4 1.0 (base) 
No 5.95E-3 27.5 
Clarity of decision-making 
criteria 
Yes 1.60E-4 1.0 (base) 
No 2.59E-3 16.2 
Clear description of an 
object 
Yes 1.84E-4 1.0 (base) 
No 2.20E-3 12.0 
Clear description of means Yes 1.81E-4 1.0 (base) 
No 2.74E-3 15.1 
Information clarity Yes 2.75E-4 1.0 (base) 
No 1.03E-1 374.5 
Feedback information Yes 2.54E-4 1.0 (base) 
No 8.89E-2 350.0 
Conformity of standards Yes 1.03E-4 1.0 (base) 




In this regard, it is estimated that the HEP of human operators who had 
performed required tasks when Procedure conformity was Yes is 2.16E-4. Meanwhile, 
the HEP becomes 5.95E-3 when human operators are exposed to the context when 
Procedure conformity was No. This alludes to the fact that, the effect of Procedure 
conformity on the HEP of human operators (or the PSF multiplier of Procedure 
conformity) would be 27.5 that can be calculated by dividing the HEP of the latter by 
that of the former (i.e., 5.95E-3/2.16E-4).  
Similarly, in the case of Clarity of decision making criteria, it is observed that the 
ratio of HEPs is 16.2. Here, the description of required tasks can be subdivided into 
twofold, such as clear decision making criteria marked as Yes (e.g., Verify the pressure 
of Tank #5 is greater than 12kgf/cm2), and unclear decision making criteria denoted by 
No (e.g., Verify the pressure of Tank #5 is stable). In other words, the decision criterion 
of the former is obvious (i.e., 12kgf/cm2), while that of the latter (i.e., stable) is so 
clumsy that it can be differently understood by human operators. 
The more interesting point is that the CART technique allows us to identify the 
combined effect of two or more PSF-related instances. That is, as explained at the 
end of Section 3.3 and Fig. 4b, it is possible to selectively apply the CART technique 
for specific PSFs. In this regard, for example, Fig. 7 shows the result of the CART 
analysis pertaining to three kinds of PSF multipliers.  
 
 
< Figure 7. Decision tree with respect to three kinds of PSF-related instances > 
 
As depicted in Fig. 7, this decision tree is created by considering three kinds of 





















= 1.46E-3 Context 4
= 8.16E-2 Context 5
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and Clear description of an object. Here, it is to be noted that the meaning of the last 
PSF-related instance is the specification of a target object to be manipulated by 
human operators. That is, it is evident that human operators easily identify what 
should be manipulated if they have to conduct a task with the description of Open 
Valve #123. In contrast, some human operators are apt to feel a frustration because of 
the absence of a specific component to be manipulated, if they are forced to carry out 
a task institutionalized as Open Valve #12@, which is one of the root causes resulting 
in an unexpected reactor trip on December 4, 2008 (refer to Section 3.2). 
With these PSF-related instances, Fig. 7 shows that the value of an HEP would be 
drastically decreased if the values of all the PSF-related instances are positive (i.e., 
Context 1 in Fig.7). In addition, it is possible to distinguish the relative importance of 
each PSF-related instance based on the HEP of other Contexts with that of Context 1. 
That is, the relative importance of Contexts 2, 3, 4, and 5 are 15.7 (1.49E-3/9.50E-5), 
21.9 (2.08E-3/9.50E-5), 15.4 (1.46E-3/9.50E-5), and 85.9 (8.16E-2/9.50E-5) respectively. 
Moreover, if the context of tasks being considered is explained by the PSF-related 
instances of Fig. 7, HRA practitioners can directly use this decision tree for 






5. Discussions and conclusion  
It is evident that managing human errors in complex socio-technical systems is 
critical for enhancing their operational safety. In this regard, the role of an HRA is 
worth emphasizing because one of its applications is to systematically distinguish 
the inventory of error-prone tasks that could trigger safety significant events. 
However, in order to enjoy the full advantage of an HRA, it is prerequisite to secure 
sufficient data that are helpful for understanding how and why human error has 
occurred (i.e., HRA data).  
For this reason, many researchers have tried to extract HRA data for several 
decades through revisiting the contents of event investigation reports which include 
detailed descriptions about what went wrong (i.e., failure cases). At glance, this 
approach seems to be reasoble for extracting HRA data. Nevertheless, it is suspected 
that HRA data identified from the analysis of failure cases could be biased because 
they just delineate a small piece of information representing the time point when a 
human error has occurred. In this light, a promising solution is to collect HRA data 
from the analysis of both failure cases and success cases.  
To this end, in this study, the catalog of PSF-related instances which are actually 
identifiable from the contents of event investigation reports was proposed. In 
addition, three kinds of practical rules were applied to calculate the number of 
success cases with respect to detailed task types. As a result, a total of 47,219 records 
containing the values of 27 PSF-related instances were acquired from the analysis of 
16 event investigation reports which have experienced from domestic NPPs for 12 
years (i.e., January 2002 to December 2013). Then these records were scrutinized by 
using the CART technique which is a very useful for distinguishing unique and/or 
hidden categories from big data. Consequently, it is expected that the CART analysis 
allows us to calculate HEPs based on the combination of two or more PSF-related 
instances.  
Basically, a spread sheet software (e.g., MS Excel) can be used to distinguish (or 
create) a decision tree based on big data as shown in Fig. 8. The problem is that the 
spread sheet software is not helpful in terms of identifying the most representative 
value of each instance. For example, let us assume that accident investigators want 
to the effect of Class and Age on the chances of survival. In this case, if accident 
investigators use MS Excel, they have to sort all kinds of information for passengers 
along with the diverse criteria of Age (e.g., less than 10, less than 15, and less than 20). 
The problem is that the number of required assortments (or the amount of effort for 
sorting) would exponentially increase if either the number of factors or the amount 
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of data to be scrutinized increases. Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that the use of 
big data mining tools (e.g., CART) is indispensable. 
It should be noted that there are at least two technical limitations for the approach 
of this study. First limitation is that the catalog of PSF-related instances only includes 
those which are actually collectable from the contents of event investigation reports. 
This means that the coverage of PSF-related instances is apt to be confined to static 
information. For example, it is not possible to collect the values of PSF-related 
instances belonging to the category of Actual condition (e.g., Task load, Workload, and 
Nature of decision making) because it is very seldom to find out an event investigation 
report which includes necessary contents for clarifying dynamic information. 
Accordingly, it is indispensable to collect the dynamic information from other 
sources in parallel, such as observations from a full-scope simulator. 
The second limitation is the assumption of a homogeneous context for success 
cases. As explained in Section 4.2, it is surmised that the context of each task being 
experienced in all success cases is identical. In addition, if it is not possible to clarify 
the exact values of PSF-related instances by reviewing the contents of a test 
procedure, walk-through and talk-through, it is expected that all the values of PSF-
related instances for each task type are positive (e.g., Allowable time is No, Time 
pressure is Low, and Multiple initiating events is No), and they are duplicated by 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝 
times (refer to Fig. 7). This means that HEPs estimated by using the CART analysis 
become optimistic if there are times when several failure cases were not properly 
documented due to a less significance (e.g., they did not cause an unexpected 
automatic reactor trip or the initiation of ESFs). In order to overcome this limitation, 
it is necessary to incorporate the contents of other available reports including CAP 
(Corrective Action Program) reports.  
For example, when an event of which the significance level corresponds to the 
Critical or Important has occurred, it is recommended to identify its cause in detail, 
which is helpful for preventing the recurrence of similar events. In contrast, instead 
of a detailed investigation, an event belongs to the Minor level is usually stored in a 
specific database that will be used as a source for further responses, such as a trend 
analysis. Although there are some differences in identifying the significance level of 
an event, EPRI (2008) suggested that events to be included in Critical level are: (1) 
Unit trip or major loss of electric production, (2) Safety incident (fatality or lost time 
injury), and (3) Significant reportable environment incident. In addition, the 
following events belong to Important level: (1) Startup failures, (2) Safety incidents 
resulting in recordable injury, and (3) Reportable environmental incidents. Here, it 
seems that the coverage of Critical level being considered in the CAP is comparable 
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to that of safety significant events for issuing event investigation reports of the 
NEED. This alludes to the fact that, if CAP reports pertaining to the Important level 
are available, it is promising to gather additional information about human errors 
with respect to the performance of a test procedure in the past, which are counted as 
success cases in this study. 
In spite of the technical limitations above, the implication of this study is quite 
positive because it can be regarded as a starting point to enhance the quality of HRA 
results by providing a novel aspect for collecting HRA data from the analysis of 
event investigation reports. That is, the contribution of this study can be considered 
from the viewpoint of the two different approaches to system safety. As stated in 
Section 2, although Safety-I suffers from several critical drawbacks pointed out by 
Safety-II approach, it is still valuable in a range of retrospective accident 
investigation and prospective risk assessment situations [Shorrock, 2014]. It should 
be again noted that Safety-II does not claim the uselessness of Safety-I; Safety-II 
should be regarded as a new system safety paradigm for supplementing the 
drawbacks of Safety-I, which have been observed in several accident situations 
during the last decades [Hollnagel, 2014]. Therefore, a desirable way for enhancing 
system safety is to integrate the two alternative approaches in a meaningful way 
[Sujan et al., 2017]. Then an arising question is how to integrate them. With regard to 
this issue, unfortunately, there is no widely accepted solution at this time. However, 
there are two approaches we can follow in relation to this issue [Yoon et al., 2017]. 
Firstly, when we use system safety methods developed under Safety-I paradigm, we 
need to acknowledge their limitations and attempt to overcome them with the 
concepts and foundations of Safety-II. Secondly, it is necessary to develop a new 
system safety method that well reflects the concepts and foundations of Safety-II 
which is good at investigating how things go right and understanding how humans 
manage performance variability. 
In this light, this study can be regarded as an attempt for realizing the first 
approach described above. Acknowledging the shortcomings of traditional methods 
for obtaining HRA data including PSF-related information and HEPs, this study 
proposed a new way of complementing them based on the concepts of Safety-II, 
without losing the benefits of using traditional methods. There is a practical reason 
why this study adopted the first approach for integrating Safety-I and Safety-II. 
Practically, it is difficult to obtain materials that describe a great deal of everyday 
diverse successful activities, whereas it is much easier to obtain materials that 
reports a set of accident or event situations (e.g., event investigation reports). Thus 
this study aims to infer the number of successful cases from the information 
reporting unsuccessful cases in event investigation reports and to use the inferred 
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number for extracting HRA data (i.e., PSF multipliers). And we need to remind that 
prospective HRA usually begins with a retrospective event analysis that investigates 
a set or previous human error-related unsuccessful cases. For this reason, we can say 
that although the method proposed in this study begins with the examination of 
human error-related unsuccessful cases, the method considered successful cases to 
reflect the concepts of Safety-II. The core concepts or principles underlying Safety-II 
include: (1) the same origin of successful and failed outcomes, (2) performance 
adjustment or performance variability, (3) the inevitable difference between WAI 
and WAD. We can discuss how the proposed method attempted to embed Safety-II 
paradigm into traditional HRA methods in terms of the three aspects.  
The approach implemented in this study rejects the view that the plausible causes 
of failure cases are different from those of success cases; it has a stance that they 
come from the same origin, as assumed in Safety-II. Accordingly, it negates the 
simple viewpoint that human errors or human error-related events can be 
significantly reduced by manipulating PSFs which are identified to increase HEP by 
analyzing only a small sample of failure cases. The proposed method assumes that 
PSFs influencing human performance negatively at one time in the execution of a 
task can be positive factors enhancing human performance at other times in the 
execution of the same task. Thus it claims that the meaning of a specific PSF needs to 
be examined from both success and failure cases of a same task. Additionally, it 
asserts that there could be other more meaningful PSFs related to human errors and 
other hidden relationships between PSFs in the execution of a task, which would not 
be easily identified by analyzing only failure cases. Although there could be various 
approaches to resolving these issues, this study suggested the extensive use of 
success cases of a same task, not only failure cases. 
As stated in Section 2, performance adjustment or performance variability is 
absolutely needed for the safe operation of modern complex socio-technical systems. 
It is highly related to the viewpoint that successful and failed outcomes have the 
same origin. Performance variability is believed to be the actual reason for both 
successful and failed outcomes. It is true that performance variability is particularly 
important in task situations that could not be expected and thus useful task 
procedures could not be provided for. However, the approach proposed in this 
study is mainly concerned with the task situations where a set of task procedures are 
effectively used. For this reason, one may argue that the concept of performance 
variability is not well reflected in the proposed approach. We also admit that it is 
likely that human task performance could not be significantly variable in the 
procedure-based task situations. However, the concept of performance variability in 
Safety-II paradigm should be considered in relation to the situation where 
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performance adjustment is needed to address dynamic task demands, without 
regard to the size of performance variability. Rather, what is important is the 
amount of performance variability aggregated as humans conduct a series of tasks 
[Hollnagel, 2012]. Then we need to consider various situations where performance 
adjustment is absolutely needed. One of the situations is when humans need to 
interpret and apply task procedures to match the current task conditions when they 
must be applied [Grosdeva and Montmollin, 1994; Hale, 1990; Hollnagel, 2014; Park, 
2009; Kim et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2013]. In this situation, the variability of human 
performance can be influenced by a range of factors (i.e. PSFs). In this regards, it 
cannot be said that the proposed method does not reflect the concept of performance 
variability. 
A design philosophy underlying the procedures of complex socio-technical 
systems is that human operators should strictly follow them when they need to be 
applied. However, it has been reported that humans sometimes do not follow task 
procedures completely with several reasons [Grosdeva and Montmollin, 1994; Hale, 
1990; HSE, 2004; Norros et al., 2015; Reason et al., 1998]. Those reasons include: the 
preference to use another short-cut for finishing a task based on experience, 
unexpected cognitive demands making it difficult to follow prescribed procedures, 
and unavailability of resources to be used to follow prescribed procedures. This 
situation represents the inevitable difference between WAI and WAD. Performance 
variability is needed in these situations as well. When human operators work 
differently from the way prescribed in a procedure, their performance can be 
influenced by diverse PSFs and their dynamic relationships. In this case, it is 
necessary to understand why and how humans do not follow the procedure, and to 
examine an effective method of utilizing PSF-related information for the 
understanding of WAD. In this regard, it can be said that the proposed method is 
one attempt to address this issue. 
As we described in Section 2, the four abilities of resilient systems are beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, it would be meaningful to consider the contribution of 
the proposed method in relation to the four abilities. In this study, we inferred a 
reasonable number of successful task cases, based on the information of human 
error-related events that can be obtained from event investigation reports. This 
means that we did not observe everyday successful task situations, and neither did 
we examine documents reporting a range of various successful tasks. For this reason, 
it is very cautious to associate the proposed method with the four abilities that are 
necessary to succeed under varying conditions. However, the HRA data extracted by 
using the proposed method can give more realistic information for assessing human 
reliability and understanding how and how significantly a particular PSF influence 
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the likelihood of human error. Then it is likely that the resulting outputs of HRA can 
give more practical insights on the following issues: (1) learning-how can we 
understand a previously experienced human error-related event more systematically, 
particularly focusing on what kinds of PSFs are more highly related to the event?, (2) 
monitoring-what kinds of PSFs are more significant to induce human errors under 
current task situations?, and (3) anticipating-how can we know the influence of 
changing the state of a PSF on the likelihood of human errors? As such, we can 
cautiously find the meanings of this study in association with the three abilities of 
resilient systems, although it would be not easy to justify them objectively.  
In terms of securing realistic HRA data, therefore, it would be necessary to think 
about further research directions for enjoying the fruit of Safety-II concept and big 
data mining techniques. Firstly, as already mentioned, it is important to 
continuously operate a specific database or program such as CAPS, which includes 
not only failure cases but also success cases. To this end, it is indispensable to set up 
firm criteria which define (or distinguish) what are success and/or failure cases. 
Unfortunately, since the distinction of success (or failure) would be varied with 
respect to industries, organizations, workplaces, and even individuals, the second 
research direction would be the provision of a common definition about the 
success/failure cases. The last research direction would be the development of a 
standardized guideline that allows us to actually collect HRA data from diverse 
industries, organizations and workplaces, which belong to different countries. 
Although there would be more critical research directions, it is highly expected that 
the collection of realistic HRA data can be started from the abovementioned three 
research directions. In this regard, the meaning of this paper is to mark the starting 
point of the associated researches, which demonstrates the benefit of Safety-II 
concept for securing realistic HRA data. 
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